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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH S. OLSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MORRIS F. SWAPP et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
15507 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF T H E CASE 
Appellant instituted an action in the Davis County 
District Court to enjoin Bountiful City, its officers and 
agents, from building a sidewalk on the south end of 
the property she and her predecessors in interest owned 
and had occupied under claim of right for more than 
T7 years. 
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Bountiful had threatened to build a sidewalk on 
said property under a claim of right it asserted to the 
property without plaintiff's permission and without 
paying or offering to pay plaintiff any compensation 
therefor. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On October 30, 1971, after the trial, the District 
Court signed a Judgment and Decree (R 50-51) by 
which it was decreed that Bountiful City was the owner 
of the property and entitled to remove any encroach-
ments and build a sidewalk thereon. Plaintiff was also 
forever barred and enjoined from asserting any title 
thereto. Subsequently on June 5, 1974, the District 
Court signed an Order (R 58) denying plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Findings, Make New Findings, or 
in the Alternative for a New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the foregoing Judg-
ment and Decree and Order of the District Court and 
a Judgment directed by the Supreme Court of Utah 
in appellant's favor based on the facts and the law 
applicable thereto. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Appellant's statement of facts is based oji the 
pleadings, papers and exhibits on file in the record of 
2 
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said case as well as on the transcript of the testimony 
which was adduced at the trial. 
The land in question is on the south side of appel-
lant's property. I t is a 5 foot strip abutting immedi-
ately to the north of the existing north curb line on 
Third North for the entire east-west distance between 
Main and First West Streets in Bountiful, Utah. 
(Actually 4.95 feet on the east side and 5.05 feet on 
the west side. (Tr. 77) 
The subject land has never been used as a street 
or for travelling purposes. The undisputed testimony 
of appellant who wras 72 at the time of trial, and of 
Lamar Barlow who was 75 at the time of trial, two of 
the oldest living residents of Bountiful born there and 
well acquainted with the area, was that it never was a 
street, that it was impassable and not open to traffic 
of any kind except possibly a person on horseback or a 
light buggy because it went through a creek bed (known 
locally as "the hollow"). (Tr. 19-21 and 30-31) 
Appellant's legal title dates back to 1872 and be-
fore. In 1872 there was a conveyance of that and other 
property from the United States to the Probate Judge 
of Davis County. The Probate Judge in that same year 
conveyed said property to a William H. Walton. That 
conveyance in 1872 to William H. Walton was pur-
si^ant to the claim William H . Walton had made to 
said land prior thereto as his said claim was recorded 
in a book brought out from the Archives of Davis 
County located in the Clerk's Office. (Tr. 65*87) By 
3 
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various and sundry subsequent mesne conveyances of 
block and lot description from William H . Walton 
and others to subsequent grantees, title finally vested 
in appellant. (See Exhibits J , K, L, M, N, O, P and 
Q)-. 
Appellant's father was James Smedley who ac-
quired the property in 1889. (See Exhibit P ) The 
plaque on the gable on the home which he built on the 
property bears a date of 1893. (Exhibit D) Thus ap-
pellant's predecessors in interest owned and occupied 
the property as their residence for more than 47 years 
prior to 1940 making a total continuous occupation of 
the property under claim of right by appellant and her 
predecessors in interest of more than 77 years. 
Extensive improvements were made on the prop-
erty such as barns, corrals, green houses, an orchard, 
trees, hedges, a garden etc. Title to all of said property 
including the existing north curb line on Third North 
which bounds appellant's property on the south was 
claimed by appellant's predecessors in interest and was 
and is claimed by appellant. The north curb line on 
Third North encloses within appellant's residential 
premises a hedge, trees, gate posts and other improve-
ments which were placed on the premises under a claim 
of right and which have been used continuously by ap-
pellant and her predecessors in interest for more than 
77 years. (See Exhibits A, B, C, D, E , F , H and I 
and Tr. 6-11) 
Bountiful City claimed title to the disputed 5 foot 
strip of property solely because it is within the boun-
4 
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daries of a platted street in a plat which hangs on the 
wall in the Davis County Recorder's Office labeled 
Bountiful Townsite Plat A. Particular note should be 
taken of the fact however that Bountiful Gity was not 
incorporated until 1892 and that the plat which accom-
panied the "Notice of Incorporation and Annexation 
of Territory" for Bountiful City made no reference 
whatsoever to roads or streets. (Tr. 50-51). In this 
regard neither did the patent by which the United 
States conveyed the property involved to Bountiful 
City's predecessor in interest make any reference to 
roads or streets. (Exhibit M) 
The plat labeled Plat A hanging in the Davis 
County Recorder's Office is not the original but only 
a paper copy. No evidence was adduced to show when 
the original was made, who made it, or as to its present 
whereabouts. Neither the original of that Plat A nor 
the paper copy which hangs on the wall in the Re-
corder's Office has ever been recorded. (Tr. 49-54) 
The precise physical location on the ground of the 
disputed 5 foot strip within the platted <rpaper" street 
delineated as aforesaid in Plat A is then purportedly 
tied in by a so called Burningham Resurvey which 
was not made until 1927. Like Plat A, the Burningham 
Resurvey of 1927 has never been recorded. (Tr. 49-54) 
According to the only evidence adduced, the first 
"time any portion of Third North, the platted "paper" 
street delineated in Plat A which purportedly embraces 
the disputed 5 foot strip, was ever used as a street, was 
about in 1930. (Tr. 20) Until the Burningham Re-
5 
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survey of 1927 there was nothing which could or did 
give anyone any indication that the property which ap-
pellant and her predecessors in interest had claimed 
and occupied to the north curb line of Third North 
between Main and First West was within a platted 
street. In this connection it should be noted that even 
the Bountiful Resurvey of 1927 does not conform in 
every respect with the assumed scale dimensions of 
Bountiful Townsite Plat A. (See testimony of Don 
Steven Milligan — Tr. 31-47). 
Appellant also testified that in 1952 when the trees 
on the property which she and her predecessors in in-
terest occupied and claimed even farther south than the 
disputed 5 foot strip were removed without her permis-
sion, the Bountiful City officials told her and repre-
sented to her that this, the north curb line of Third 




T H E COURT ERRED IN PROHIBITING 
APPELLANT FROM TESTIFYING FUR-
THER W I T H REFERENCE TO BOUND-
ARIES, CONDITION AND USE OF THE 
LAND OWNED, CLAIMED AND USED BY 
H E R FATHER AN£> AS TO OTHER MAT-
TERS OF FAMILY HISTORY. 
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During the trial appellant tried to more fully elab-
orate concerning the boundary limits of the land she 
now occupies and claims which is the subject matter of 
this appeal as well as concerning its condition and the 
use of and the improvements made thereon by her 
father who was her predecessor in interest but she was 
prevented from doing so. (Tr. 5-8) The court erred in 
not allowing this testimony as a well recognized ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. This testimony would have 
established even more conclusively that appellant should 
have prevailed and that Bountiful City was not the 
owner of the land. In 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 463 at page 
408 it says in part: 
"Under the English common law, exceptions to 
the hearsay rule are made as to evidence of gen-
eral custom or reputation concerning boundaries 
of puplic property. Under this rule traditionary 
evidence is admissible to show the boundaries of 
parishes, manors, and other public estates, but 
not for the purpose of proving the boundary of 
a private estate where the lines are not identical 
with those of a public nature. The prevailing 
rule in the United States, however, is that evi-
dence of common reputation is admissible as to 
the location of a private, as well as a public, 
boundary line. Ancient boundaries, corners, and 
boundary trees frequently cannot be established 
otherwise than by reputation, and hence, this 
species of evidence is admissible of necessity '* 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Later on in Sec. 581 at page 488-489: 
ceAdmissions and declarations of parties are fre~K 
quently admitted in evidence as competent in qte^  
7 
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termining questions relating to title, ownership, 
and possession of property, both real and per-
sonal (Emphasis supplied) 
* * * 
". . . It is generally recognized that the declara-
tions of one claiming title to real estate by ad-
verse possession or of his predecessors in posses-
sion, during the statutory period, are admissible 
to show the nature of his possession and claim 
of ownership " 
See also in this connection Wigmore, 3rd Ed., Sec. 
1582. 
POINT I I 
BASED ON T H E FACTS IN T H E RE-
CORD AND THE LAW APPLICABLE 
THERETO, T H E COURT ERRED IN DIS-
MISSING T H E COMPLAINT AND IN AD-
JUDICATING THAT BOUNTIFUL CITY 
WAS T H E RIGHTFUL OWNER OF THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY. 
The facts iji this case and in the case of Hall v. 
North Ogden City, 166 P.2d 221, rehearing granted 
and judgment set aside 175 P.2d 703 (1946) are strik-
ingly similar, When the extremely important distinc-
tion in the facts is considered, it is even more convincing 
that the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint and in adjudicating that Bountiful City was the 
owner of the disputed 5 foot strip of land. 
8 
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In each case the respective plaintiff tried to enjoin 
the municipality, North Ogden in the Hall case and 
Bountiful City in this case, from opening up land it 
claimed title to because it was within the boundaries of 
a platted street. In each case the land came originally 
from the United States by patent under the Federal 
Townsite Act, 14 Stat. 541 and then by subsequent 
mesne conveyances by block and lot description until 
the legal title to the land vested in the respective claim-
ants. The important distinction is that in the Hall 
case, at the time of the conveyance by patent from the 
United States there was a plat in existence showing 
designated streets while in this case there is no evidence 
whatsoever that at the time of the conveyance by patent 
from the United States there was such a plat in exist-
ence showing designated streets. 
The Court in the first Hall case, in reciting some 
of the undisputed facts said at page 222 of 166 P2d: 
"Plaintiffs and appellants instituted this suit to 
enjoin the town of North Ogden and its officials 
from opening up as streets certain tracts of land 
indicated as streets by the plat of the survey of 
the townsite of North Ogden filed April 27, 
1870. On August 2, 1872, by patent, the United 
States conveyed to Franklin D. Richards, 
County Judge of Weber County, Utah, "in 
trust for the several use and benefit of the occu-
pants of the Town of North Ogden, Weber 
. County, Utah Territory, according to their re-
spective interests", certain lands in Township 7 
North, Range 1 West, in Weber County, which 
lands were embraced within the area of lands 
9 
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platted as the townsite of North Ogden into lots, 
blocks and streets. The patent recited that it was 
executed in accordance with the provisions of 
the act of Congress of April 24, 1820, and the 
act of Congress approved March 2, 1867, en-
titled "An Act for the Relief of Inhabitants of 
Cities and Towns upon the Public Lands," com-
monly known as the Federal Townsite Act." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The conveyance by patent in the Hall case refers to 
streets. Unlike the Hall case the facts in this case show 
that on May 2, 1872, pursuant to the Townsite and 
related acts, the United States by patent conveyed ajl 
of the land including the disputed land to the Probate 
Judge " . . . in trust for the several use and benefit of 
the inhabitants of the Townsite of Bountiful Davis 
County Utah Territory . . . " After setting forth the 
legal description of the land being conveyed by town-
ship, range, block etc., the patent continued: 
". . . according to the Official Plat of the survey 
of said lands returned to the General Land Of-
fice by the Surveyor General, which said tracts 
have been purchased by the said Hector C. 
Haight, Probate Judge, as aforesaid . . . " (Ex-
hibit M) 
The survey referred to in the foregoing patent was 
not introduced into evidence and is not part of the re-
cord in this case. No streets are mentioned in that 
patent. Undoubtedly the survey referred to in that 
patent, like the survey which accompanied tl^e Bounti-
ful City incorporation notice (Tr. 50-riJl), described 
the land only by township, range, section, block etc., 
10 
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similarly to what most cadastral surveys do. Streets 
are not mentioned. 
In both the Hall case and in this case some of the 
witnesses who testified were some of the oldest residents 
who were born, raised and lived in the area. They knew 
the property as long as they knew any property. They 
knew and testified that the disputed land had never 
been used as a street and that the respective plaintiffs 
and their predecessors in interest had occupied tha dis-
puted land as long as persons of their respective ages 
could remember. Under those facts, Justice Wade who 
wrote the dissenting opinion in the first Hall case 
which later became the law in Utah when the first Hall 
case was reversed by the second Hall case said: 
". . . The foregoing facts require the conclusion 
that plaintiff's predecessors in interest were oc-
cupying the portions of the lands which were 
platted as streets and which they now occupy, 
at the time the Townsite was entered by the 
County Judge for the benefit of the occupants 
thereof. Any opposing conclusion would be un-
reasonable. . . . " 
Justice Wade then went on to discuss the provisions of 
the Townsite Act and the related Act which was 
adopted by the Territorial Legislature saying further: 
"There are many cases which have interpreted 
this Federal statute, including some from the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in cases 
very similar to this one, and they have held with-
out exception that at the time of the entry of the 
land of the townsite the occupants thereof have 
11 
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a vested right to the use of the streets and alleys 
then existing and being used, and that each of 
such occupants at that time becomes to the extent 
of the lands which he then occupied the benefic-
iary of the trust created by the act and was then 
vested with the equitable ownership of the land 
which he then occupied, and that while the execu-
tion of the trust was subject to the rules and 
regulations of the territorial Legislature, neither 
by such rules nor by any act of the trustee could 
the beneficiary be divested of his rights which 
accrued to him under the act of Congress at the 
time of the entry, of the townsite was made. 
Such cases further hold that the filing and re-
cording of a map or plat of the townsite either in 
accordance with the territorial regulations or 
otherwise, which showed no street to exist where 
one existed and was then being used by the oc-
cupants at the time of the entry, or which showed 
a street or alley to exist over lands or a part 
thereof which was then occupied by a settler, 
could not divest the settlers of the right to use 
the street or alley which existed and were being 
used at the time of the entry, nor divest the oc-
cupant of his vested equitable ownership of all 
of the lands then occupied by him, and any at-
tempt to do so would be null and void. (Num-
erous cases cited) (^Emphasis supplied) 
Later on in that first Hall case which was reversed and 
which dissenting opinion of Justice Wade became the 
law in Utah, Justice Wade said at page 229: 
" . . . Nor did the city or town of North Ogden 
obtain the right to take for public streets the 
Ljtnd in question without compensation. . . ." 
12 
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In reversing the first Hall case and rendering its 
decision in favor of the plaintiff in the second Hall 
case the court referred to and quoted from the case of 
City of Globe v. Slack, 11 Ariz. 408, 95 P . 126. 
The Globe case is exactly in point with one phase of 
this case. In the Globe case like in the instant case 
there was no plat of streets until after the entry. The 
plat showing designated streets was made after the 
entry and after the land platted as a street was already 
occupied and claimed. In mentioning the Globe case 
the court said at page 710 of 175 P2d: 
"The case of City of Globe v. Slack, supra, as to 
this phase of the case is exactly in point. The 
Globe townsite was entered in 1882, and there-
after the lands thereof were platted into lots, 
blocks and streets. When the entry was made 
one McDowell was occupying what was later 
platted as Lot 1 in Block 74, and the lands ad-
joining it were platted as a street, he had a resi-
dence on the lot and a barn and closet on what 
was platted as a street. The trustee deeded to 
him the lot which he was occupying but did not 
include therein the land which he was occupying 
which was platted as a street and he accepted 
such deed and paid the fee therefor. Thereafter, 
McDowell sold and conveyed to plaintiff Slack 
his interests. In the deed he described the land 
only as Lot 1 in Block 74, but did not describe 
the lands which were platted as a street, but 
Slack took possession of the lands occupied by 
McDowell which were platted as a street as weil 
as the lands in the lot, and later built a fence 
around all of them. The lands platted as a street 
which were occupied by McDowell were never 
13 
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used for street purposes, the city threatened to 
enter and open up the street thereon and Slack 
sued to enjoin the city therefrom. In holding in 
favor of Slack the court said (11 Ariz. 480, 95 
P .127) : 
"Neither the act of Congress nor that of the ter-
ritorial Legislature specifically make provision 
for the dedication of streets, nor for the disposal 
by probate judge of any part of the lands for 
other public purposes. The occupants, however, 
had a vested interest in the streets and alleys as 
they existed at the time the townsite was entered, 
and the trustee had no authority to destroy them. 
(Citing Ashby v. Hall, supra). But no authority 
was given to establish new ones. . . . In attempt-
ing to create additional streets, however desirable 
such a general plan may have been, they ex-
ceeded their authority, and the streets which they 
platted, existing only on paper, were not law-
fully established. (Citing cases). Nor does it 
appear that there has been any dedication of the 
land for street purposes by the occupants. 
Bountiful City hasn't claimed nor could it pos-
sibly claim that appellant ever affirmatively or by ac-
quiescence dedicated the disputed 5 foot strip on the 
south end of her property as a public street. Accord-
ingly, it ;s not necessary to review and analyze the bal-
ance of the thrust of the decision in the Hall case supra 
which appellant submits is controlling in this case. 
POIJNT I I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N D E N Y I N G 
P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION TO A M E N D F I N D -
14 
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INGS, M A K E N E W F I N D I N G S , OR I N T H E 
A L T E R N A T V E F O R A N E W T R I A L . 
The trial of the case on appeal here was held and 
concluded on July 30, 1971. On October 30, 1971, the 
court made and entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law (R. 46-49) as well as the Judgment 
and Decree based thereon. (R. 50-51) Thereafter 
plaintiff-appellant timely filed a "Motion To Amend 
Findings, Make New Findings, or in the alternative, 
for a New Trial". (R. 52-55) The court didn't rule 
on this Motion until approximately three years later 
when on June 5, 1974, the court summarily denied that 
Motion in all respects. (R. 58) 
Appellant respectfully submits that the requested 
findings are supported by ample, competent evidence 
in the record and that an objective analysis of the case 
and a proper determination of the case justifies that 
they be made. The failure of the court to make the 
requested findings constitutes reversible error. 
P O I N T IV 
B O U N T I F U L C I T Y S H O U L D BE E S T O P -
P E D FROM A S S E R T I N G A N Y CLAIM TO 
T H E D I S P U T E D L A N D A N D A P P E L L A N T 
S H O U L D NOT B E D I S T U R B E D I N H E R 
P E A C E A B L E POSSESSION A N D OCCUPA-
T I O N U N L E S S B O U N T I F U L C I T Y PRO-
C E E D S TO T A K E SAID L A N D I N A P R O P E R 
C O N D E M N A T I O N P R O C E E D I N G . 
15 
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Appellant is well aware of the conflict which exists 
in the cases as to whether the right of the public to 
land dedicated for a street or highway may be ex-
tinguished by nonuser or adverse possession due to 
laches, negligence or nonaction of city authorities. How-
ever, many courts do recognize and apply the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel. 
In the case of Oliver v. Synhorst, 86 Pac. 376, 48 
Or. 292, (1906) the Supreme Court of Oregon ap-
plied the doctrine in a case which was instituted to en-
join the city street superintendent from removing or 
interfering with a fence and sidewalk or in any manner 
destroying or interfering with plaintiff's shade trees, 
ornamental trees and shrubbery on the disputed prop-
erty. During the course of its decision the court said at 
page 378: 
". . . for more than 13 years the plaintiff an4 
her grantor have been in the open, exclusive, and 
peaceable possession of the strip of land now in 
controversy, and that they have made, without 
objection from the city authorities, valuable and 
permanent improvements thereon in good faith, 
believing that they were the owners thereof. The 
question for decision is whether, by reason of 
these facts, the city is now estopped to assert that 
the true street line is other than where the plain-
tiff's fence is located." 
The court answered the question by going on to say: ' 
". . . while the rule may be that the ordinary 
statute of limitations as such cannot be set up to 
defeat tjie right of the public to the use of a 
street or highway, there may grow up, in conse-
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quence of the laches of the public authorities, 
private rights of more persuasive force in the 
particular case than that of the public, and if 
"acts are done by an adjoining proprietor which 
indicate that he is in good faith claiming as his 
own that which is, in fact, a part of the highway, 
as he supposes or claims it to be, the public will 
be estopped." (Cases cited) 
The Supreme Court of Oregon also applied the doctrine 
of estoppel in the case of Dabney v. City of Portland, 
263 Pac. 386, 124 Ore, 54 (1928) wherein during the 
course of the decision the court said at page 388: 
"We think the doctrine of estoppel in pais ap-
plied. . . . * * * 
"Where there has been long-continued nonuser 
by a municipality, and valuable and permanent 
improvements have been made with its consent or 
acquiescence, in good faith, equity will not permit 
the city to change its position to the material 
damage of the person thus misled. The ground-
work of equitable estoppel is a species of 
f raud. . . . " 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is recognized by 
the Supreme Court of Utah. In the cases of Tpoele 
City v, Elkington, 117 P2d 406, 100 Utah 485, Hall 
v. North Ogden City supra, and Cox v. Carlisle, Mayor 
of Manti City, 359 P2d 1049, 11 Utah 2d 372 the doc-
trine was held not to be applicable but it was applied 
in Premium Oil v„ Cedar City, 187 P2d 199, 112 Utah 
213 and in Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P 766, 50 Utah 
593o In the Wall case supra the court refused to allow 
Salt Lake City to open Eighth South Street to the 
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full dedicated width because of the conduct of the city-
officials and agents in permitting the abutting owner 
to expend money and effort on improvements which 
extended into the platted dedicated street. 
If necessary the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
should be applied in this case and Bountiful City 
should be estopped from asserting any claim to the dis-
puted property for several reasons. First, as detailed 
in the argument of Point I I , Bountiful City never ac-
quired legal title to the disputed 5 foot strip. Second, 
Bountiful City hasn't claimed nor could it possibly 
claim any right thereto by virtue of a purported dedica-
tion of it as a public street by appellant. And finally, 
because of Bountiful's long acquiescence of the use and 
occupation of the disputed property by appellant and 
her predecessors in interest who erected many valuable 
improvements thereon as well as because of the affirm-
ative representations which the officials of Bountiful 
made to appellant that the north curb line of Third 
North between Main and First West Streets consti-
tuted the full extent of Bountiful's claim to the south-
ern portion of appellant's property. 
CONCLUSION 
I t is respectfully submitted that under the facts 
and applicable law the decision of the lower court should 
be reversed and the case remanded with a mandate that 
judgment be entered in favor of appellant. 
Q U E N T I N L. R. A L S T O N 
Attorney for plaintiff-appellant. 
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